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Abstract
In the present paper we uncover a novel mechanism through which
a minority can gain a disproportionate power in a perfectly functioning
democracy. In our model, a government elected by majority within a two
party democracy, decides on a unique redistributive instrument, the tax
rate. We show that a minority characterised by a high degree of social
identication may, in the presence of ideological motives, inuence the
policy outcome. In particular, a rise in social identication among the
rich minority may be able to reduce the tax rate. Importantly, this may
happen even if the minority is more ideological than the majority. Finaly,
we attempt an explanation of the divide in the tax rate between the US
and Europe.
1 Introduction
The fundamental distinction between a democracy and a nondemocracy1 is that
in a democracy all agents possess equal political weight. As each citizen has
a vote, common wisdom suggests that democracy will lead to the choice of
policies that reect the preferences of the poor, provided these are in greater
number. This has important implications, as for example it would suggest
hightax rates. However, occasional observation suggests that often minorities
are disproportionately inuential. Typical explanations are that the minority
is able to control the party system, as the political agenda, to form an e¤ective
lobby against certain policies, or to gain monopoly on information (see Austen-
Smith (1997) for a review).
Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas. Sede Región Centro. Circuito Tecnopolo
Norte s/n. Col. Hacienda Nueva, Aguascalientes, Ags. Mexico. CP 20313. E-mail address:
david.juarez@cide.edu.
yDepartment of Economics, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ,
UK. E-mail address: cghig@essex.ac.uk.
1Following Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) we use the term nondemocracy to designate
alternatives, such as dictatorship or autoritarian regime, since it has less specic connotations
than any of the other words.
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In this literature, agents typically behave rationally in the pursuit of their
self interest. However, social identity has been shown to a¤ect a large portion of
human social behavior, and in particular, the behavior of voters. As introduced
by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) social identity is related to the "persons sense of
self". The role of the status of the members of the group, seen as a pillar of this
theory, often generates in-group altruism. This is true in the case considered
here in which the issue is the level of taxation, or equivalently, the level of
redistribution.
In view of what just said, one may wonder whether social identity may shake
the democratic dictatorship of the median voter. This paper explores this ques-
tion and shows that indeed social identication, modeled as in-group altruism,
may provide an alternative way to allow a minority to be disproportionately
inuential. As we see below this indeed occurs, and through a novel and unex-
pected channel.
To gain intuition we rst start to note that social identication alone is
not enough to destroy the median voter theorem. However, the presence of
preference uncertainty changes this conclusion. In probabilistic voting models
with ideological concerns2 , when the members of a social minority are more
willing to change their party allegiance than the majority, the swing voters
belong to this group and the political equilibrium is tilted toward the preferences
of this group. Ideology alone therefore unambiguously reduces political power.
However, group identication, modeled as in-group altruism, depreciates the
relative weight given to ideology and therefore increases the political power of
the social group. The present paper analyses the combined e¤ects of this two
forces. In particular we show that a minority with high social identication may
gain a disproportionate power in the choice of public policies without the need
of being less ideological.
As an application we try to solve the long standing puzzle of the wide dif-
ferences in the tax-rates in use in di¤erent democracies, in particular the divide
US vs continental Europe. In fact, the model do propose a mechanism by which
a country can vote an apparently low tax rate, opening the door to wide di¤er-
ences in tax rates across countries.
We now describe the model we use. As in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006)
we consider the competition between two partisan parties in a representative
democracy made up of two main social groups: an Elite, that is a rich minority,
and a poor majority. Voters derive utility both from their after tax income and
from which party is in power, the ideological motive.
2Probabilistic voting has some nice properties: equilibium exists, cycles are avoided, and
the equilibrium may correspond to the utilitarian social welfare optimum. Such conditions
hold even in multidimensional policy space formulations. (see Coughlin (1982), Kirchgässner
(2000). See Coughlin (1992) for a survey.
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The model introduces identity through social preferences in a way similar
to Akerlof and Kranton (2000). As noted before, improving the groupss status
requires to increase the welfare of the other members of the group. However,
this is not universal altruism as is commonly known, as it is directed at in-
group members rather than being universal. We assume that this altruistic
motive has two components: utility depends positively on the average income
of the individuals in the group and negatively on the level of inequality in the
group. The rationale for this formulation can be found in the maximization of
the groups welfare (see Wittman (2005)).
The rest of the model is standard. Parties align their preferences to those
of the poor and o¤er platforms on the only public policy we consider: a fully
redistributive tax rate (we take gross income to be xed and known). As each
social group has di¤erent preferences on the tax rate, the choice of public policy
is inherently conictive. We allow ideology diversity within the social groups:
individuals can support any political party regardless of the social group to
which they belong.3 We assume that ideology is only imperfectly observed by the
parties; parties assign probability distributions to individualsparty preferences.
As is standard in probabilistic voting models, both parties are assumed to make
the same probability assignments.
Every individual votes for the party that best promotes his own utility, which
has egotistic, altruistic and ideological terms. As the proceeds from the tax rate
are redistributed via lump sum transfers to the whole population, a vote from
an individual is a vote on tax rate. Each of the two political parties selects its
redistribution policy so as to maximize its expected utility. Hence, the voters
make use of the parties to obtain a government that promotes their utility and
the parties make use of the voters to gain power - the political system thus being
formed by the interaction between two categories of maximizing agents. This is
the mechanism that allow the members of the minoritarian Elite to a¤ect the
equilibrium tax rate.
In the model, for each social group there are three competing factors that
determine the equilibrium tax rate: ideology, the general level of in-group al-
truism and the relative weight given to inequality aversion relative to average
income within the group. In general, we show that strong in-group altruism
within members of a minority depreciates the relative weight given to ideology,
giving to the minority a disproportionate weight in the choice of public policies.
However, the relative weight given to inequality aversion also plays a role. These
forces may lead to complex predictions as the following paragraphs illustrate.
We obtain three sets of results. First, we show that in-group inequality
aversion has always a positive e¤ect on the tax rate, that is, a rise in inequality
aversion, keeping xed all other parameters, increases the equilibrium tax rate.
3This approach di¤ers from Roemer (1999), who assumes that parties represent, imper-
fectly, di¤erent constituencies, or economic classes.
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The role of the overall level of group identication, keeping xed the relative
weight of inequality aversion, depends on the identity of the group that is af-
fected by the change and the level of inequality aversion. In particular, for low
weights given to inequality aversion, when the rise in altruism concerns the rich
minority, the rise will eventually lead to a decrease of the equilibrium tax rate.
When the rise concerns the poor majority, the equilibrium tax rate always rises.
The second set of results concern the e¤ect of simultaneous but opposite
changes4 in the level of group identication in the two groups. We nd that if
the rich and the poor place a low weight on their income inequality aversion, in
a democracy in which the di¤erence in in-group altruism across social groups is
greater, the social group that exhibits greater in-group altruism pushes the tax
rate in its "natural" direction.5
The third set of results concern simultaneous changes in ideology and in
social identity. When changes in ideology a¤ect similarly both social groups,
the outcome is ambiguous and depends on the prevailing levels of altruism and
the weight given to inequality aversion by the social groups. The results also
depends on the details of the shifts in ideology.
A rst results shows that a low level of ideology and a high level of altruism
contributes to the political power of the group. In this case, increasing the
general level of ideology of both groups will increase the political power of the
group that has relatively low ideology. In particular, provided the rich place
a low weight on their inequality aversion, the general rise in altruism rises the
power of the minority that nally translates into a decrease in the tax rate, the
"natural" direction for the rich.
The second result is surprising. Indeed, it shows that the condition that
the rich are less ideological than the poor is not necessary to obtain a low tax
rate. In fact, there exists an interval of ideologies for the rich, lying above the
ideology of the poor, such that a rise in ideology reduces the equilibrium tax
rate, provided the rich exhibit higher in-group altruism than the poor and their
inequality aversion is not too high.
This result is important because it sheds light on the trade-o¤ between ide-
ology and social identity. At rst sight, and in view of the literature, in a society
where the rich are more ideological than the poor, as the rich individuals are
more attached to the political parties, the rich receive low favour from the eco-
nomic policy. However, we show that this fact could be reversed if, in addition,
the rich exhibit greater social identication than the poor do.
4 If (Bpk; Brk) designate the levels of in-group altruism of the poor and the rich in democ-
racy k, we focus on di¤erences such that Brk +Bpk = Brk0 +Bpk0 for all k; k0:
5This result holds irrespective of the prevailing levels of ideology and altruism in democracy
1.
4
The aim of the paper is related to the vast literature on how interest groups
a¤ect outcomes in elections and in legislatures. The literature has shown many
ways the elite can manipulate the prevailing policy through contributions, lob-
bying and other informational activities (see Austen-Smith (1997) for a re-
view). For example, the elitesability to mobilize large groups of voters explains
the turnout in elite-driven mobilization models (e.g., Uhlaner (1989), Morton
(1991), Shachar and Nalebu¤ (1999), and Herrera and Martinelli (2006) cited in
Evren (2010)). Often, the elite chooses entry barriers, regulations and ine¢ cient
contracting institutions that retard economic growth and create resource mis-
allocations in order to protect their economic rents and redistribute resources
to themselves (e.g., Mancur Olson (1982), Per Krusell and Jose-Victor Rios-
Rull (1996), Stephen Parente and Edward J. Prescott (1999) cited in Acemoglu
(2010)). A recent example of this line of thought is Bandiera and Levy (2010).6
They propose a model with two main groups: the elite and the poor. Impor-
tantly, a segment of the poor, referred to as the ethnic group, have di¤erent
preferences. The elite can gain weight in the choice of public goods by forming
a stable coalition with the ethnic group. Then, despite the numerosity of the
poor, the outcome is not the bliss point of the poor. The theoretical predictions
are illustrated with evidence on the allocation of public goods in Indonesian
villages, using di¤erences in ethnicity as a measure of preference diversity.
Acemoglu and his coauthors - in particular Acemoglu and Robinson (2006
and 2008) - focus on the change of political regime and in particular the switch
to democracy or the persistence of the elite control.7 They adopt the framework
of probabilistic voting and provide micro-political foundations to the fact that
the elite may have disproportionate political power in a democracy. In fact,
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) analysis suggest that minorities can gain power
beyond their vote share not only through lobbying, or capture the party system,
but also indirectly as a consequence of ideology. To this analysis we add social
identication, a motive that as we will see may dramatically a¤ect the results.
The main special feature of the paper, is the role given to social identication.
Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have developed and formalized the notion of social
identity in economics. Recent work has mainly focused on experiments, see,
for e.g., Kranton, Pease, Sanders and Huettel (2013). In political economy,
Fowler and Kam (2007) have extended the participation model by adding a
terms related to general in-group altruism, where the groups are dened by
political party a¢ liation. They show that both altruism and social identication
increase political participation.
Closer to our work, the role of social identity on the level of redistribution
in a democracy has been analyzed in Shayo (2009). A rst distinction is that
6Another intereting is Bourguignon and Verdier (2009), who consider an elite trying to
extract as much rent as possible from the economy while trying to minimize the probability
of losing political power.
7Within the institutional approach Hossain et al. 1999 establish that institutional change
obey the behaviour of the elite and their incentives to permit and invest in such change.
5
in his model all agents are assumed to vote directly and sincerely over the tax
rate (that is, each agent votes for his most preferred tax rate), and the median
tax rate is adopted. In fact, as noted by the author, this mechanism is very
similar to a Downsian two-party electoral competition with pure majority rule.
In his model, only the poor majority will determine the level of redistribution.
The channel uncovered in the present paper is not present in a model without
ideology, because of the median voter theorem. Second, in Shayo (2009) the
available multiplicity of equilibria produces an apparent negative correlation
between the level of class identication and the level of national identication.
It is this mechanism that leads the US, which are characterised by a high national
identication, to produce a low tax rate. However, there is no evidence of this
pattern.
Finally note that the impact of universal altruism has been widely studied,
including in political economy.8 For example, Dixit and Londregan (1998) con-
sider the care that citizens and politicians alike have for distributive equity, and
relate this to altruism. They conclude that the voter with median income gains
the most. Altruism has also been used to mend the nonexistence arising in the
selsh Dawnsian model, and shown to lead to stable majorities and transitive
preferences (see, e.g. Wittman (2005)). However, altruism has rarely been in-
volved in the political process, even less in-group altruism. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the rst attempt to relate social identication, or in-group
altruism, to the power of minorities.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we present our model.
The equilibrium tax rate when there is no ideology is characterized in Section
3. In Section 4, we characterize the equilibrium tax rate in a general model.
In Section 5 we analyze the role of altruism on equilibrium tax rate. In section
6 we attempt an explanation of the puzzle related to the cross-country data on
tax rates. Section 7 concludes. Appendix contains some proofs.
2 The model
To study political conict over the tax rate, we develop a model of political
competition with heterogeneous individuals, two political parties, and two social
groups, based on Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Individuals are ordered from
poorest to richest. There is a proportional income tax with resulting lump sum
transfers. Social identity plays a role in individual choices. We model this by
assuming that individuals have altruistic preferences to members belonging to
the same social group. All individuals vote according to their ideology and the
tax rate they prefer most, following a probabilistic voting model. As the political
parties are partisan they have preferences on policies as well as on whether they
win the election. They compete to maximize their expected utility functions.
8Fehr and Schmidt (2006) review the evedence gathered by experimental economists and
psychologists. They also suggest how it can be best interpreted and how it should be modeled.
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Each political party aligns its preferences, including the altruistic component,
to those of the poor to capture the fact that the rich are not able to control the
party system. We now present the model explaining its components in greater
detail.
2.1 The economy
We consider a society with n (odd) citizens. Individual i = 1; 2; 3; : : : ; n, has
income yi. Individuals are ordered from poorest to richest and let the median
person be the individual with median income, denoted by yM . The individual
with median income is then individualM = (n+ 1) =2. Let y denote the average
income in this society,
y =

1
n
 nX
i=1
yi (1)
The political system determines a nonnegative income tax with rate 0    1.
Tax revenues are redistributed via lump sum transfers to all citizens. Let the
resulting lump sum transfer to each individual be T .
We assume that it is costly to raise taxes. Let C : [0; 1] ! R+ be the
deadweight cost of taxation associated to the tax rate. In the model, increases
in the tax rate eventually reduces tax revenues due to the large loss associated
with the distortions, captured by the assumption C (0) = 0 and C 0 () > 0:
Furthermore, we assume the cost to be strictly convex, C 00 () > 0; that C 0 (0) =
0 and that C 0 (1) = 1, ensuring the existence of an interior optimal tax rate. As
total income in the economy is ny, the cost induced by a tax rate  is given by
C ()ny. These assumptions model the property that the disincentive e¤ects of
taxation become substantial as the tax rate increases. Finally, the lump sum
transfer made by the government to each individual is
T =
1
n
 
nX
i=1
yi   C ()ny
!
= (   C ()) y (2)
2.2 Preferences of citizens and social groups
The society consists of two di¤erent socioeconomic groups of voters or social
classes; the poor and the rich. The poor (p) have income below the average
income in the society (yp  y) and the rich (r) have income above the average
income (yr > y). There are np poor individuals and nr rich individuals, where
np +nr = n and np > nr. As we assume individuals to be ordered from poorest
to richest, the groups Poor and Rich are dened by:  p = fi j 1  i  npg,
 r = fi j np+1  i  ng. The sets of pre-tax income of the poor and of the rich
are, respectively, Y p =

yk j k 2  p	 and Y r = yk j k 2  r	. The average
income of the poor is yp and of the rich is yr.
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Individuals care about their own after-tax income and, departing from the
Downsian model, the ideology of the party in power. The non-ideological compo-
nent of their preferences is characterized by a direct utility function. Following
a stripped down formulation of social identity theory (see Akerlof and Kranton
(2000) and Shayo (2009), has altruistic motives towards his group. We assume
that the altruistic motive has two components: it depends positively on the
average income of the individuals in the group and negatively on the level of
inequality in the group. The utility of an individual in group g is of the following
form9
Ug(Y g) = xg +Bg
"
xg   Eg
X
k2 g
jxk   xgj
ng
#
where xg is the after tax income, that is xg = (1  ) yg + (   C ()) y and yg
is the pre-tax income of a voter in group g. The altruistic motive is modeled
such that the utility of a voter in group g depends on the average income of
the individuals in her group and by the level of income inequality in the group.
The overall magnitude of the e¤ect is captured by the parameter Bg while the
relative weight associated to income inequality aversion by the parameter Eg.
The particular form of the utility function is borrowed from Wittman (2005)
and has its justication in the maximization of the groups welfare. The realism
of the two terms can be illustrated by the following. Suppose that the altruistic
motive focuses only on the mean of the social group. An increase of the mean
of the social group could be given by allocating all the income to one person.
Clearly, there must be a better way to do this. Introducing aversion towards
inequality can mend this weakness. In particular, we could then increase the
median average income in a way that maximize the social welfare of the group.
A rise in the average income of the peers would not be seen as benecial if it
is associated to a sharp rise in income inequality. There are, of course, many
possible altruistic functions, but the linear formulation is a good compromise
between tractability and realism.10
The utility function described above gives rise to an indirect (or ex-post)
utility of voters in group g associated to the tax rate  that is noted V g(). It
is given by
V g(Y g j ) = (1  ) yg +Bg (1  ) yg  BgEg (1  )
P
k2 g
jyk ygj
ng
+ (1 +Bg) (   C ()) y
(3)
We use the notation V g(Y g j ) instead of V g() because agents do not care
directly about the tax rate, but taxes have an indirect e¤ect because they a¤ect
the income of each agent, which is an argument of the utility function. Note that
9With a slight abuse of notation, we use the superscript g to denote social classes as well
as individuals in each social class, so for most of the discussion we have g = p or r.
10See Wittman (2005) for the possible disadvantages of the utility function.
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all individuals in a particular group have the same V g() and that the egotistic
utility a voter in group g obtains from income is linear in income as yg. The
weight the voter attributes to altruism is characterized by Bg > 0; the larger is
Bg, the larger the voter weights the income in the group. The associated utility
is Bgyg: On the other hand the disutility a voter obtains from income inequality
in the group is characterized by a relative weight Eg > 0. Another way to see
the same property is that the benece of higher mean income of the peers Bgyg,
is moderated by the multiplicative factor 1 Pk2 g (jyk   ygj)=ngyg; that is 1
minus the relative average absolute deviation in income. This view highlight
an interesting feature of the indirect utility function V g(Y g j ); A rise in the
average income of the peers would not be seen as benecial if it is associated to a
sharp rise in income inequality. Finally, it is worth noting that the assumptions
about C () ensure that V g(Y g j ) is strictly concave and twice continuously
di¤erentiable, which are su¢ cient conditions for V g to be single-peaked.
In the model agents are ideological. We assume that an individual j in group
g has the following preferences over the tax rate and ideology
~V gj( ;m) = V g() + ~gjm (4)
when party m;m = L;R; comes to power. The term ~gjm can be interpreted
as ideology (or non-policy) related benets that the individual j receives from
party m. Note that in the model individuals within the same economic group
may have di¤erent ideological preferences. Let us dene the di¤erence in ideo-
logical benets for individual j in group g by ~gj = ~gjR   ~gjL : We assume that
the ~gj of an individual in group g is extracted from a given distribution charac-
terized by a smooth cumulative distribution function F g dened over ( 1;1),
with the associated probability density function fg:
Finally, note that the ideology position of group g is given by fg (0), that is
the value at ~gj = 0 of the probability density function associated ~gj : Indeed,
with an argument similar to the one in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), sup-
pose that social group p is more "ideological" than r, meaning that there are
individuals in this group with strong preferences towards party L or R. This
fact corresponds to the density function fp having a relatively large share of its
weight in the tails. In contrast, suppose group r is not very ideological, and
the majority of the group vote for the party that gives them slightly better tax
rate. This fact corresponds to having relatively little weight in the tails of fr,
and therefore a large value of fr (0). Then, the less ideological is a group g, the
larger is the value of fg (0).
2.3 Voting behavior
We adopt the framework of probabilistic voting. There is electoral competition
between the two political parties, L and R. Let (L; R) be the policy platform
proposed by the parties. Let g be the proportion of voters in group g; with
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p + r = 1. Let gm be the fraction, determined endogenously, of voters in
group g voting for party m, where m = L, R. Then the expected share of
voters of party m is
m = 
rrm + 
ppm: (5)
The preferences on the tax rate by an individual j in group g is given by
~V gj( ;m) = V g() + ~gjm : As the di¤erence in ideological benets for individual
j in group g is dened by ~gj = ~gjR   ~gjL , the voting behavior of individual j
can be represented by the following expression
pgj (L; R) =
8<:
1 if V g(L)  V g(R) > ~gj
1=2 if V g(L)  V g(R) = ~gj
0 if V g(L)  V g(R) < ~gj
9=; (6)
Equation (6) gives the conditions for individual j in group g to prefer L over
R. Note that, as all that matters is the di¤erence in ideological benets, the
condition involves only ~gj . Expression (6) implies that the fraction of voters
in group g voting for party L (and its policy L) is
gL = F
g (V g(L)  V g(R)) (7)
where F g is the smooth cumulative distribution function, with the associated
probability density function fg, from which ~gj of individual j in group g is
extracted.
2.4 Political parties
Political parties L and R are partisan in the sense that they have preferences
over policies as well as over whether they win the election. Let wL () and
wR () be the utility party L and R obtain from policy  . Let P (L; R)
be the probability that party L wins the election when the parties o¤er the
policy platform (L; R). Party R naturally wins the election with probability
1  P (L; R).
In probabilistic voting, the probability that a party wins the election is given
by its vote share. Then, using equations (5) and (7), the probability that party
L wins the election is given by
P (L; R) =
X
g=r;p
gF g (V g(L)  V g(R))
Each political party chooses the tax rate that maximizes its expected utility for
the given policy platform
Party L:Max
L
[P (L; R) (K + wL (L)) + (1  P (L; R))wL (R)]
Party R:Max
R
[(1  P (L; R)) (K + wR (R)) + P (L; R)wR (L)] (8)
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whereK is the rent from being in o¢ ce, which is assumed to be non-negative. As
in the present model ideology and policy are completely independent dimensions
of choice, there is no guide in choosing party preferences. We assume that both
parties adopt the preference of the most numerous, the poor, that is wL () =
wR () = V
p (). This is arguably the less favorable case for the elite, and
therefore provides the strongest possible result. Furthermore it capture the fact
that the rich are not able to control the party system.
Finally, we also assume that both parties choose their policies (policy plat-
forms) simultaneously. So far we have dened all the basic blocs of the model.
Now we proceed to obtain the equilibrium tax rate.
3 Political equilibrium: the model without ide-
ology
First, we analyze the case without ideology motives. In this Downsian model all
that matters to determine the equilibrium tax rate is the income of the voters.
This simpler model allows us to obtain the tax rate preferred by an individual in
each social group. Then, we obtain the tax rate preferred by the median voter.
3.1 The tax rate preferred by each social group
We derive each individual gs ideal tax rate from the indirect utility function.
Indeed, this is the tax rate g that maximizes V g(Y g j ) given by expression
(3). The rst-order conditions, written in their Kuhn-Tucker form, allowing for
the possibility that the preferred tax rate by an agent in group g is zero, can be
written as
 yg  Bgyg +BgEg
P
k2 g
jyk ygj
ng
+ (1 +Bg) (1  C 0 (g)) y = 0 if g > 0, and
 yg  Bgyg +BgEg
P
k2 g
jyk ygj
ng
+ (1 +Bg) (1  C 0 (g)) y  0 if g = 0.
(9)
Note that a su¢ cient condition for a maximum is (1 +Bg) ( C 00 (g)) y < 0,
which always holds as C 00 (g) > 0. Furthermore, the preferred tax rate is
positive g > 0 whenever 1 > C 0 (g) > 0. The following result is proved in the
appendix.
Lemma 1 Let the preferences of a poor voter be given by expression (3) with
g = p. There is a value E^p > 0 in the weight given by the poor to inequality
aversion such that for any Ep  E^p a poor voter prefers a positive income tax
with rate 0 < p < 1.
The previous analysis ensures that, in a model without ideology, a poor voter
always prefer a strictly positive tax rate and that the poorer she is the greater
is the tax rate she prefers. Furthermore, her preferred tax rate also positively
11
depend on her altruism (size of Bp), the income inequality among the whole
population (size of y   yp), the weight on inequality aversion (size of Ep), and
nally the size of inequality among the poor (size of
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
).
A similar exercise can be performed for a rich individual. However in this
case, when Er > E^r it is not straightforward to see that a rich voter always
prefers a positive tax rate. Consequently, we can only state the conditions for
the rich preferring a zero tax rate as stated in the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 Let the preferences of a rich voter be given by expression (3) with
g = r. There is a value E^r > 0 in the weight given by the rich to inequality
aversion such that for any Er  E^r a rich voter always prefer a zero tax rate,
 r = 0.
The previous analysis, derived from the Kuhn- Tucker conditions, imply that
the poor always want a positive tax rate, 0 < p < 1, whenever Ep  E^p. On the
other hand, the rich do not want any redistribution,  r = 0, whenever Er  E^r.
As the poor favour high taxes and a large redistribution while the rich disfavor
income redistribution, the choice of the tax rate is inherently conictive. In this
context the Median Voter Theorem implies that the equilibrium tax rate is the
tax rate preferred by the median voter.
3.2 The Median voter
As individuals are ordered from poorest to richest and there are more poor
individuals than rich ones, the median voter is a poor voter (yM < y). From the
discussion above, we conclude that the median voter prefers a strictly positive
tax rate, 0 < M < 1, that satises the condition in Lemma 1.
Form expression (9) we know that the tax rate preferred by the median voter
is positively a¤ected by several factors: 1) an increase in income inequality; 2)
an increase in inner altruism, Bp; 3) an increase in the the weight of inequality
aversion, Ep; and 4) an increase in inequality aversion. These factors in turn
a¤ect the equilibrium tax rate. We apply the implicit function theorem to
expression (9) to analyze such e¤ects. The e¤ect of income inequality in the
entire population on the tax rate is given by the following expression:
@(yp)
@yp
=
 1
(1 +Bp)C 00 ((yp)) y
< 0 (10)
Then, as inequality of income increases, keeping everything else constant and
in particular y, the median voter becomes poorer, and yp decreases. Hence,
from expression (10) we see that as the median voter corresponds to a poorer
individual, then the median voter prefers a larger tax rate. This leads to the
following Lemma:
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Lemma 3 There is a value E^p > 0 in the weight given by the poor to inequality
aversion such that for any 0 < Ep  E^p, the grater is the inequality of income
among the entire population, the greater is the tax rate preferred by the median
voter.
Similarly, the implicit function theorem tells us that the impact of inner
group altruism on tax rate is given by the following expression:
@
@Bp
=
(1  C 0 (p)) y   yp + Ep
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
(1 +Bp)C 00 (p) y
(11)
The sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of the numerator. We
know that (1  C 0 (p)) y   yp is positive and Ep
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
is positive as
well. From expression (28) in the appendix, we know that the poor prefer an
interior tax rate whenever Ep  E^p for E^p = ypP
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
> 0. Then @@Bp > 0
if 0 < Ep  E^p: Therefore, there always exists a bound below which an increase
in altruism increases the tax level. The following proposition summarizes this
result:
Proposition 4 There is a value E^p > 0 in the weight given by the poor to
inequality aversion such that for any 0 < Ep  E^p the greater is the inner group
altruism exhibited by the median voter Bp the higher is the tax rate she prefers
M .
Finally, we now focus on the direct impact of the weight the poor group
places on inequality aversion. The fact that
@
@Ep
=
Bp
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
p
(1 +Bp)C 00 () y
> 0 (12)
leads to the following result.
Lemma 5 There is a value E^p > 0 in the weight given by the poor to inequality
aversion such that for any 0 < Ep  E^p the greater is the weight placed by the
median voter on inequality aversion, the greater is the tax rate she prefers.
Lemma 3 and Lemma 5 along with Proposition 4 individuate the factors
a¤ecting the tax rate preferred by the median voter in the absence of ideology.
By choosing the tax rate as the one preferred by the median voter and ignoring
ideological concerns, the median voter model eliminates a powerful and surpris-
ing channel by which the minority of rich agents can inuence the equilibrium
tax rate. However, these results set the stage for our analysis with ideology.
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4 Political equilibrium with ideology
The introduction of ideological concerns leads to a non-cooperative game be-
tween the parties. The resulting Nash equilibrium of the policy competition
game between the two political parties is a pair of policies (L; 

R) that solve
the maximization problems given by equation (8). The rst-order condition of
party L with respect to its own policy choice, L, taking the policy choice of
the other party as given is:
P
g=r;p 
gfg (V g(L)  V g(R)) @V
g(L)
@L
(K + V p (L)  V p (R))
+
P
g=r;p 
gF g (V g(L)  V g(R)) @V
p(L)
@L
= 0
(13)
In the appendix it is shown that the second-order condition associated to the
above program is also satised, therefore the rst order condition characterizes
an interior maximum.
Since the problems of parties R and L are symmetrical, party R and party
L promise the same policy. Hence, in equilibrium, R = 

L = 
, satisfying:X
g=r;p
gfg (0)
@V g ()
@
K +
@V p ()
@
X
g=r;p
gF g (0) = 0
Implying that X
g=r;p
gfg (0)
@V g ()
@
K + 12
@V p ()
@
= 0 (14)
where the second line makes use of the fact that in equilibrium each party wins
the election with probability 12 , thus
P
g=r;p 
gF g (0) = 12 .
Equation (14), which gives equilibrium tax rates, also correspond to the
solution to the maximization of the following weighted utilitarian social-welfare
function: X
g=r;p
ggV g () (15)
where r = fr (0)K and p = fp (0)K + 12p are the weights that di¤erent
groups receive in the social-welfare function. We state this result as the following
Lemma for future reference:
Lemma 6 Consider a set of tax rates choices  2 [0; 1] and let the preferences
be given by (4) as a function of the tax rate and the ideological benets from the
party that is in power, with the distribution function of ~gj given by F g. Then,
the equilibrium tax rate is given by  and it maximizes the weighted utilitarian
social-welfare function, (15).
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The equilibrium tax rate announced by both parties, obtained after substi-
tuting equation (3) into equation (14), and denoted by  satisfy
r[fr(0)K]

 yr Br yr+BrEr
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
+(1+Br)(1 C0())y

+
p[fp(0)K+ 12p ]

 yp Bpyp+BpEp
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
+(1+Bp)(1 C0())y

=0
(16)
As seen from equation (16), the equilibrium tax rate depends on four central
features of the society: i) the proportions of poor and rich (p, r); ii) The
ideology position of each social group (fp (0), fr (0)); iii) The degree of inner
altruism of the social groups (Bp, Br); and iv) the relative weight given to the
aversion to income inequality in the social groups (Ep, Er).
In the next sections we nd conditions to guarantee the existence of an
interior equilibrium tax rate and perform the comparative statics analysis.
4.1 Equilibrium tax rate
We focus on situations in which the political equilibrium involves a positive tax
rate, that is,  > 0. In this case, the outcome of the political competition
among the parties leads to to the equilibrium policy t which solves equation
(14).
The rst order conditions are necessary and su¢ cient for an interior equi-
librium policy  > 0 if and only ifX
g=r;p
gfg (0)
@V g (0)
@
K +
1
2
@V p (0)
@
> 0 (17)
Expression (17) is saying that the tax rate  = 0 is not a critical point of the
rst-order condition given by equation(14). We prove in the appendix that
inequality (17) is satised for the set of parameter values we consider.
4.1.1 The e¤ect of ideology on the equilibrium tax rate
We may now apply the implicit function theorem to expression (16) to investi-
gate the impact of ideology on the equilibrium tax rate. We have the following
e¤ects:
@
@fr (0)
=
r
h
dV r()
d
i
K
C 00 () y (rr (1 +Br) + pp (1 +Bp))
< 0 (18)
@
@fp (0)
=
p
h
dV p()
d
i
K
C 00 () y (rr (1 +Br) + pp (1 +Bp))
> 0 (19)
Expressions (18) and (19) show that, everything else constant, a social group
pushes the tax rate in its "natural" direction by being less ideological. The less
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ideological are the rich, the lower is the tax rate. The less ideological are the
poor, the greater is the tax rate. The following proposition summarizes this
result:
Proposition 7 The less ideological are the rich (resp. the poor), the lower
(resp. the higher) is the tax rate. In other words, a social group pushes the tax
rate in its "natural" direction by being less ideological.
In a di¤erent model, Persson and Tabellini (2000) conclude that ideological
neutral groups are more responsive to policy (and hence care less about ideology)
in a neighborhood of the equilibrium policy; they are more likely to reward
politicians with votes and get a policy closer to their bliss point.
4.1.2 The e¤ect of the size of the social groups on the equilibrium
tax rate
We may also use (16) to investigate the e¤ect of the size of the social groups on
the equilibrium tax rate. In a democracy it is generally expected that economic
policies reect the preferences of the majority, via the principle one-person-one-
vote. In the model, the e¤ect of the size of the social groups on the tax rate is
characterized by the following expressions:
@
@r
=
r
h
dV r()
d
i
C 00 () y (rr (1 +Br) + pp (1 +Bp))
< 0 (20)
@
@p
=
p
h
dV p()
d
i
C 00 () y (rr (1 +Br) + pp (1 +Bp))
> 0 (21)
Expression (20) shows, everything else constant, that the greater is the propor-
tion of rich, the lower is the equilibrium tax rate. On the other hand, expression
(21) shows that the greater is the proportion of the poor, the greater is the equi-
librium tax rate. This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 8 The greater is the relative size of the rich minority, the lower
is the equilibrium tax rate.
Note that an analogous result for the majority could also be obtained: The
greater is the proportion of poor, the greater is the tax rate. The proposi-
tion then supports the idea that the more numerous are the rich (resp. the
poor) more inuential they are, and consequently the tax rate decreases (resp.
increases).
5 The power of the Elite: the role of social iden-
tication
The main focus of the paper is on the role of social identication, modeled via
in-group altruism (see Section 2.2), on the tax rate achieved under political
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equilibrium. In the model, in-group altruism is formalized as
Ug(Y g) = xg +Bg
"
xg   Eg
X
k2 g
jxk xgj
ng
#
where xg is after-tax income and Y g is set of pre-tax incomes of voters in group
g. We assume that the altruism, generated by social identication, has two
dimensions. First, agents care about the average income of their own group.
Second, agents dislike income inequality in their group. The magnitude of these
two e¤ects are captured by the coe¢ cients Bg and BgEg: In this sense, a rise in
Bg, keeping Eg xed, can be seen as a uniform rise in altruism. The coe¢ cient
Eg represents the relative weight agents attribute to inequality aversion. In the
following sections we investigate the role of these factors on the equilibrium tax
rate. The analysis is intended to capture both di¤erences across two democracies
as well as temporal shifts within a given democracy.
5.1 The role of in-group inequality aversion
In this section we focus on the direct impact of the weight that a social group g
places on income inequality on the tax rate, keeping all other factors una¤ected.
We obtain the following expression:
@
@Eg
=
ggBg
P
k2 g
jyk ygj
ng
C 00 () y (rr + pp)
> 0 (22)
As the derivative is always positive, expression (22) tells us that, everything else
equal, the greater is the weight placed on inequality aversion, the greater is the
equilibrium tax rate, this e¤ect being true for both the poor majority and the
rich minority.
Proposition 9 Everything else equal, the greater is the weight placed by a social
group on in-group inequality aversion, the greater is the equilibrium tax rate.
The results hold irrespective of the levels of ideology and altruism Bg. In
particular, even for the elite a rise in their inequality aversion imply an increase
of their preferred tax rate. Note that without ideology, only the properties of
the median voter, which is a poor voter, would matter.
5.2 The role of pure in-group altruism
Unlike the e¤ect of in-group inequality aversion on the tax rate, which does not
depend on the levels of ideology and altruism, the e¤ect of the level of overall
in-group altruism, Bg, depends on in-group inequality aversion. Formally, the
marginal e¤ect of Bg on the tax rate is given by the following expression
@
@Bg
=
gg
h
(1  C 0 ()) y   yg + Eg
P
k2 g
jyk ygj
ng
i
C 00 () y (rr (1 +Br) + pp (1 +Bp))
(23)
17
The sign of the derivative is determined by the sign of the numerator, the
denominator being always positive. The e¤ect of a rise in altruism Bg depends
on the relative weight given to inequality aversion Eg as the following results
shows. Importantly, in the Proposition the bounds E^r and E^p depends on all
the parameters of the model via , and in particular on ideology.
Proposition 10 The comparative statics of the equilibrium concerning the level
of altruism Bg is such that
1. There is a value E^r > 0 in the weight given by the rich minority to in-
equality aversion such that for any 0 < Er  E^r the greater is the in-group
altruism within the rich, Br, the lower is the tax rate .
2. There is a value E^p > 0 in the weight given by the poor majority to inequal-
ity aversion, such that for any 0 < Ep  E^p the greater is the in-group
altruism within the poor, Bp; the higher is the tax rate .
Proof. Part 1. As 0 < C 0 () < 1 the expression yr   (1  C 0 ()) y is
always positive. Expression (30) in the appendix shows that according to their
egoistic motives, the rich prefer a zero tax rate whenever 0 < Er  E^r for E^r =
yr yP
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
. As
h
(1  C 0 ()) y   yr + Er
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
i
< 0 for Er  E^r,
we have that
@
@Br
< 0 if 0 < Er  E^r (24)
Therefore, there always exists a bound in the in-group inequality aversion of the
rich below which an increase in altruism decreases the tax level.
Part 2. On the other hand, focusing on the poor agents, the sign of @@Bp
also depends on the sign of the numerator of expression (23). We can use the
bound used to sign expression (12) in section 3 to obtain that
@
@Bp
> 0 if 0 < Ep  E^p (25)
Therefore, there always exists a bound in the in-group inequality aversion of
the poor below which an increase in altruism increases the tax level. Note that
the bound is a¤ected by the level of ideology, as it depends on the tax rate 
which is a¤ected by ideology.
The intuition for the rst result is as follows. Because the rich are a minority,
their individual income is a decreasing function of the tax rate, and therefore
rich agents tend to prefer a zero tax for any 0 < Er  E^r, at least according
to their egoistic motives. The bound exists because their inequality aversion
pushes them to vote for a higher tax rate. Finally, by rising their in-group
altruism, Br, their political weight grows leading to a lower tax rate.
The intuition for the second result is as follows. Because the poor are the
majority, their individual income is an increasing function of the tax rate, and
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therefore poor agents tend to prefer a high tax rate. Furthermore, their inequal-
ity aversion also pushes them to vote for a higher tax rate. Therefore, this holds
as long the equilibrium exists, which is ensured by 0 < Ep  E^p.11 Finally, by
rising their altruism Bp their political weight grows leading to a higher tax rate.
The general mechanism operating here is that in-group altruism within mem-
bers of a social group depreciates the relative weight given to ideology and there-
fore increases the political power of the social group. In particular, this means
that an in-group altruistic Elite minority may gain a disproportionate power in
the choice of public policies without the need of being less ideological.
5.3 Opposite changes in in-group altruism across social
groups
In the previous analysis we focus on the e¤ect of variations in a single parameter
on the equilibrium tax rate. However, often di¤erences between countries a¤ect
several parameters. Similar shifts across time for a given country can also a¤ect
more than one parameter. We consider two main cases.
In the rst scenario, suppose the degree of in-group altruism in both social
groups varies in exactly opposite directions but by the same magnitude. For
example, consider two countries, democracy 1 and democracy 2. Let the degree
of in-group altruism of the poor and the rich in country k be (Bpk; Brk) respec-
tively. Suppose that the di¤erence in altruism across the two social groups in
democracy 2 is higher than in democracy 1 but assume that Br + Bp is the
same in the two democracies, that is, (Bp2; Br2) = (Bp1   ';Br1 + ') with
' > 0.12 The question we want to address here is to know in which democracy
the tax rate is greatest. Although this way of capturing the e¤ect of di¤er-
ences in inner altruism is obviously restrictive, it helps to gain an intuition on
which democracy will face a higher tax rate. The result leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 11 Assume that the change in Br and in Bp are exactly opposite,
that is Br +Bp, is a constant. There exist values (E^p,E^r) as dened in Propo-
sition 10 such that if 0 < Ep  E^p and 0 < Er  E^r, then the following is
true
a) If the rich increase their inner altruism while the poor decrease theirs in
the same amount in equilibrium the tax rate reduces.
b) If the poor increase their inner altruism while the rich decrease theirs in
the same amount in equilibrium the tax rate increases.
11Existence is not a problem for the rich, as they never vote for a too high tax rate.
12We have the opposite case as well. Let Bp2 = Bp1 + ', Br2 = Br1   ' with ' > 0, we
obtain Br2 +Bp2 = Br1 +Bp1.
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Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 11 states that in a democracy in which the di¤erence in social
identication across social groups is greater, the social group that sees an in-
crease in its identication pushes the tax rate in its "natural" direction. In
particular, if, as given in part a) of the Proposition, in democracy 2 the rich
exhibit greater group identication than the poor, then the equilibrium tax rate
in this democracy is lower than the tax rate in democracy 1. On the other
hand, if, as given in part b) of the Proposition, in democracy 2 the poor ex-
hibit greater group identication than the rich, then the equilibrium tax rate in
this democracy is greater than the tax rate in democracy 1. This result holds
irrespective of the prevailing levels of ideology and altruism in democracy 1.
5.4 Social identity and Ideology
In the previous section we looked at the case in which the level of ideology of
the social groups is constant, or in the cross-country interpretation, the level
of ideology of the rich (resp. the poor) in both countries is the same. Here we
analyse the e¤ect of changes in ideology on the tax rate. We will see that the
e¤ect on the equilibrium tax rate is ambiguous and depends on the prevailing
levels of altruism and the weight given to inequality aversion by both social
groups.
To simplify the analysis and obtain sharp result we consider changes in the
level of ideology occurring in the direction of the vector representing the existing
ideology. For example, consider two countries, democracy 1 and democracy 2.
Let the levels of ideology of the poor and the rich in country k be (fpk (0) ; f
r
k (0))
respectively. Supposing that (fp2 (0) ; f
r
2 (0)) = t(f
p
1 (0) ; f
r
1 (0)) with t > 0, we
would like to know in which democracy the tax rate is greatest. The following
results hold
Proposition 12 1. Suppose the rich are less ideological than the poor, fr (0) >
fp (0), and the rich exhibit higher in-group altruism than the poor, Br >
Bp, then, there exist values ~Ep > 0 and ~Er > 0 such that if 0 < Ep  ~Ep
and 0 < Er    ~Er~EpEp + ~Er an increase in the level of ideology in the
direction f (0) = (fp (0) ; fr (0)) reduces the equilibrium tax rate.
2. Suppose the rich exhibit higher in-group altruism than the poor, Br >
Bp > 0, then there exist , 0 <  < 1; and values ~Ep > 0 and ~Er > 0
such that if 0 < Ep  ~Ep and 0 < Er    ~Er~EpEp + ~Er and the rich are
more ideological than the poor with fp (0) < fr (0) < fp (0), an increase
in the level of ideology in the direction f (0) = (fp (0) ; fr (0)) reduces the
equilibrium tax rate.
Proof. See appendix.
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The rst part of the Proposition is intuitive in view of the previous sections.
Indeed, both low level of ideology and high level of altruism generate political
power to the group. Increasing ideology in this case, will increase the political
power of the rich. Provided the rich place a low weight on their inequality
aversion, the rise of minority power translates into a decrease in the tax rate,
the "natural" direction for the rich.
The second part of the Proposition is more surprising. Indeed, it shows that
the condition that the rich are less ideological than the poor is not necessary
to obtain a result similar to Part 1. of the Proposition. In fact, there exists an
interval of ideologies for the rich lying above the ideology of the poor such that
a rise in ideology reduces the equilibrium tax rate, provided the rich exhibit
higher in-group altruism than the poor and their inequality aversion is not too
high.
This result is important because it sheds light on the trade-o¤ between ide-
ology and social identity. At rst sight, and in view of the literature, in a society
where the rich are more ideological than the poor, as the rich individuals are
more attached to the political parties, the rich receive low favour from the eco-
nomic policy. However, we show that this fact could be reversed if, in addition,
the rich exhibit greater social identication than the poor do.
In this regard, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) propose a mechanism by
which a minority can inuence the political outcome even in a purely democratic
one man one vote democracy, with a 50% threshold. Indeed, in a probabilistic
voting model ideology is a feature that unambiguously decreases political power
so that a scarcely ideological minority can defeat a highly ideological majority
in the political process. We show that in the presence of social identication this
simply link may break. Indeed, even a highly ideological minority could defeat
a less ideological majority, provided the minority exhibits a higher degree of
social identication towards the members of the minority.
6 Explaining the dispersion of tax rates
The model proposes a mechanism by which a country can vote a low tax rate as
a result of the disproportionate power gained by the rich minority. The results
are generated by the interplay between ideology, social identication and pre-tax
income distribution.
First, suppose that ideology doesnt play any role, in which case the model
is Downsian and what counts is the median voter, who is a poor voter. As a
class is dened in the present model by its average income, the highest tax rate
would be obtained for countries in which the poor class has the strongest class
identication. Countries in which poor voters have a strong national identi-
cation but a low class identication would come next, but the di¤erence would
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be small as the poor form the majority. Last would come those countries where
voters show little social identication, at least along the dimension of wealth or
income. In general, the stronger is the social identication the larger should be
the tax rate and therefore the redistribution.
This simple mechanism outlined above is counterfactual as national identi-
cation is, according to the data, much stronger in the US than in Europe while
the tax rate is much lower in the US. However, a twist may mend the problem.
Assuming that the total amount of identication is constant would allow to link
large national identication to low class identication. This mechanism would
lead to a lower tax rate for countries with high national identity as the US
(Figure 8, Shayo). However, it may be argued that as the majority is poor, it
is unlikely that shifting the identication of the poor majority from class iden-
tication to national identication would generate enough e¤ect to explain the
divide US/Northern Europe. In fact, only via a dynamic feedback, leading to
multiple equilibria as in Shayo (2009), this channel may produce the expected
large e¤ect. In the present paper, we reveal a new channel by introducing ide-
ology, in which case the vote intentions of swing voters matter and can a¤ect
the policy outcome.
With ideology, the swing voters are important and these can push the equi-
librium in their direction. A rst way swing voters can be highly redistributive
is when these are poor. Another possibility is that the swing voters are rich but
their national identity dominates their class identity or when they have a strong
in-class inequality aversion. Putting together these pieces we can attempt the
following explanation for the observed wide cross country variation in the tax
rates. We now attempt a concrete picture.
The low tax rate in the US can be rationalised as follows. In the US the
level of ideology is small and the swing voters play an important role. However,
as the poor are more ideological than the rich, the swing voters are rich, and
a low tax rate is produced provided the national identity of the rich is not too
strong (that is still compatible with a strong average national identity) or the
inequality aversion of the rich is not too large.
The northern European and Germanic countries have a high tax rate. This
can be explained supposing that these are highly ideological countries in which
the role of swing voters is reduced. Furthermore, due to the high education of
the poor, the poor form a large share of the swing voters. Finally, if the swing
voters are poor, or if they have a large in-group inequality aversion, the tax rate
would be denitely high.
In the Latin countries, both the rich and the poor are highly ideological,
reducing the role of swing voters. Still, we should expect the poor to be more
ideological than the rich because of lower education. The swing voters are
mostly, but not exclusively, rich individuals. Furthermore, inequality aversion
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is higher than in the US. As a result redistribution is still higher than in the
US but lower than in Northern Europe. Finally, in Anglo-saxon countries, the
poor are slightly less ideological than in other European countries, increasing
the scope of the swing voters. Furthermore, because of the lack of strong class or
national identity, the tax rate is lower than in many other European countries.
We would like to compare this scenario with the data. Unfortunately, data
on the level of ideology of voters is di¢ cult to obtain. Indeed, votes for a given
party, or intention of votes, reect both the ideology preferences as well as the
pure, brand like, ideology. In other words, parties tend to be associated with
policies, for example the Republican to low tax rates. On the other hand, in
our model ideology is a brand name that is not correlated to the policies
implemented. Because ideology is here the residual after taking into account
the real policy, pure ideologyit very hard to measure. Furthermore, the model
asks for data on ideology by class, which is a further obstacle. Obtaining data
on social identication is not much easier, particularly when specic to given
classes.
7 Conclusion
Why in democracies where power is apparently given to the most numerous
class government decisions seem to be made which favour a minority, the elite?
Our analysis shows that the answer may rely on the level of social identication
of the groups. Among the many results delivered by the analysis, we show that
if the rich place a low weight on their income inequality but care about the
average income in their class, the higher their social identication they exhibit,
the lower the equilibrium tax rate. Our analysis also compares democracies that
di¤er along several dimensions, but in this case the e¤ect of social identication
depends generally on the weights given to inequality aversion. We nd inter-
esting the result that if in democracy A the rich are more ideological than in
democracy B but they exhibit greater social identication than the poor, the
equilibrium tax rate in democracy A may be lower than the tax rate in democ-
racy B. Finally, we exploit this mechanism to attempt an explanation of the
wide di¤erence in the tax rate in place across otherwise similar countries, a long
standing puzzle.
Altogether, these results highlight the role played by social identity in the
political power of the minorities and in the role these have in determining equi-
librium policies. There are several directions for future research. In the paper,
social identity as well as the distribution of ideology are exogenously given. In
a more comprehensive model, classes would realize the gains from loosing their
ideological component and strengthening their social identity and consequently
would take actions to a¤ect the distribution of these factors as a responseto
what they expect from the government.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Rearranging (9), we obtain the condition
1 > C 0 (g) = 1  1
(1 +Bg) y
"
yg +Bgyg  BgEg
X
k2 g
jyk ygj
ng
#
= 1  U
g(Y g)
y (1 +Bg)
(26)
However, from expression (26) it is not straightforward to conclude that the
poor prefer a strictly positive tax rate. We know that for a poor individual
there exists " > 0 such that yp = y   ". Expression (26) then becomes
C 0 (p) =
1
(1 +Bp) y
"
"+Bp
 
y   yp + Ep
X
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
!#
(27)
Note that expression (27) is positive because " > 0, Bp > 0, y  yp > 0, Ep > 0,
and
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
> 0. Then, given the convexity of C () and the fact that
C 0 (p) > 0; a poor voter prefers a positive tax rate, p > 0.
In addition, we need to guarantee an interior optimal tax rate for the poor.
This is, 1 > p. Then, given the convexity of C () such condition reduces to
satisfy 1 > C 0 (p). For g = p in expression (9) we have
1  C 0 (p) = 1
(1 +Bp) y
"
yp +Bpyp  BpEp
X
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
#
Then, 1  C 0 (p) > 0 implies
yp +Bpyp  BpEp
X
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
> 0
which reduces to
yp +Bp
"
yp   Ep
X
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
#
> 0
As yp > 0, for the previous expression to hold we need yp Ep
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np

0. Then, whether 1   C 0 (p) > 0 depends on the value of Ep. Let E^p =
ypP
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
> 0 such that yp   E^p
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
= 0. Therefore
1  C 0 (p) > 0 if 0 < Ep  E^p (28)
As expression (28) is positive whenever 0 < Ep  E^p the poor has an interior
solution, 0 < p < 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. In this case there exists "1 > 0 such that yr = y + "1.
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For this rich individual expression (26) becomes
C 0 ( r) =
1
(1 +Br) y
"
 "1 +Br
 
y   yr + Er
X
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
!#
(29)
The tax rate preferred by the rich depends on the sign of expression (29). The
rich individual would prefer a zero tax rate,  r = 0, whenever C 0 ( r)  0 while
she would prefer a positive tax rate,  r > 0, whenever C 0 ( r) > 0. As  "1 < 0,
y   yr < 0, Br > 0, Er > 0, and
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
> 0 the sign of expression (29)
is determined by the sign of expression

y   yr + Er
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr

. Then,
whether expression (29) is negative depends on the value of Er and on how big
is "1. First, we focus on the value of Er. Let E^r =
yr yP
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
> 0 such that
y   yr + E^r
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
= 0. Note that C 0 ( r) =  "1(1+Br)y < 0 if Er = E^r.
Therefore
C 0 ( r) < 0 if 0 < Er  E^r (30)
As expression (29) is negative whenever 0 < Er  E^r the rich prefer a zero tax
rate,  r = 0. In this case, we have a corner solution and the rst-order condition
given by expression (9) does not hold as an equality.13 Note that when Er > E^r
it is not straight forward to see that a rich voter always prefers a positive tax
rate. In fact, in this case we would also need to specify the value of "1 leading
the rich voter to prefer a positive tax rate.
Proof Su¢ cient condition for the partisan parties maximisation
problem. The rst order conditions associated to the maximization of the
expected vote share of party L is (according to expression (13))P
g=r;p 
gfg (V g(L)  V g(R)) @V
g(L)
@L
(K + V p (L)  V p (R))
+
P
g=r;p 
gF g (V g(L)  V g(R)) @V
p(L)
@L
= 0
Taking the derivative of the previous expression with respect to L and evalu-
ating it at the optimum (L; 

R) we obtain expression SC:
SC =
P
g=r;p 
g[fg (V g(L)  V g(R)) @V
g(L)
@L
@V p(L)
@L
+
(K+V p(L) V p(R))

fg(V g(L) V g(R))
@2V g(L)
@2
L
+

@V g(L)
@L
2
fg0(V g(L) V g(R))

]
+
P
g=r;p 
g
"
F g(V g(L) V g(R))
@2V p(L)
@2
L
+
@V p(L)
@L
F g(V g(L) V g(R))
@V g(L)
@L
#
As we know that  = R = 

L we obtain
SC=
P
g=r;p 
g[fg(0)
@V g()
@L
@V p()
@L
+K

fg(0)
@2V g()
@2
L
+

@V g()
@L
2
fg0(0)

]
+
P
g=r;p 
g

F g(0)
@2V p()
@2
L
+
@V p()
@L
fg(0)
@V g()
@L

13Note that it is not possible in general to compare E^r and E^p because
P
k2 g
jyk ygj
ng
cannot be compared.
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We need to show that SC < 0 in the equilibrium. As the probability density
function fg associated to ~gj is smooth and symmetric, its mean equals its
median and mode, so that at ~gj = 0 we have fg0 (0) = 0. Then
SC = r[fr (0) @V
r()
@L
@V p()
@L
+Kfr (0) @
2V r()
@2L
]
+p[fp (0) @V
p()
@L
@V p()
@L
+Kfp (0) @
2V p()
@2L
]
+r
h
F r (0) @
2V p()
@2L
+ @V
p()
@L
fr (0) @V
r()
@L
i
+p
h
F p (0) @
2V p()
@2L
+ @V
p()
@L
fp (0) @V
p()
@L
i
Re-arranging we have:
SC = rfr (0) [@V
r()
@L
@V p()
@L
+K @
2V r()
@2L
+ @V
p()
@L
@V r()
@L
]
+pfp (0) [
h
@V p()
@L
i2
+K @
2V p()
@2L
+
h
@V p()
@L
i2
]
+rF r (0) @
2V p()
@2L
+ pF p (0) @
2V p()
@2L
As @V
p()
@L
> 0, @V
r()
@L
< 0, @
2V p()
@2L
< 0, and @
2V r()
@2L
< 0 the rst and the
third line of the previous expression are negative. There exists K0 such that
2
h
@V p()
@L
i2
+K0
@2V p()
@2L
= 0 so that for any K  K0 we have 2
h
@V p()
@L
i2
+
K0
@2V p()
@2L
 0. In this case the second line of the expression is also negative.
As a consequence SC < 0 at  = R = L whenever K  K0. Therefore  is
a local maximum.
Proof of proposition 11. Assume that 0 < Ep  E^p and 0 < Er  E^r;
where the values (E^p; E^r) are dened as above. Then, as proved in proposition
10, @@Br < 0 for 0 < Er  E^r and @@Bp > 0 for 0 < Ep  E^p. Note the prevailing
in-altruism exhibited by the social groups as B1 = (Bp1; Br1).
a) Assume the rich increase their inner altruism while the poor decrease theirs
in the same amount, ((Bp2; Br2) = (Bp1   ';Br1 + ') = (Bp1; Br1) +
' ( 1; 1)), for ' > 0. This change implies that both social groups vary
their in-altruism in direction B2 = ( 1; 1). The impact on the equilibrium
tax rate  when both groups modify their inner altruism on direction B2
is given by the following directional derivative
@
@B2
=

@
@Bp
;
@
@Br

 B2kB2k =

@
@Bp
;
@
@Br

 1p
2
( 1; 1) ,
Then
@
@B2
=
1p
2

  @

@Bp
+
@
@Br

< 0.
Then, if the rich increase their inner altruism while the poor decrease
theirs in the same amount in equilibrium the tax rate decreases.
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b) Assume the poor increase their inner altruism while the rich decrease theirs
in the same amount, ((Bp2; Br2) = (Bp1 + ';Br1   ') = (Bp1; Br1) +
'(1; 1)), for ' > 0. This change implies that both social groups vary
their in-altruism in direction B3 = (1; 1). The impact on the tax rate 
when both groups modify their inner altruism in the direction B3 is given
by the following directional derivative
@
@B3
=

@
@Bp
;
@
@Br

 B3kB3k =

@
@Bp
;
@
@Br

 1p
2
(1; 1) ,
Then
@
@B3
=
1p
2

@
@Br
  @

@Br

> 0.
Then, if the poor increase their inner altruism while the rich decrease
theirs in the same amount the equilibrium tax rate increases.
These results hold irrespective of the prevailing levels of in-group altruism
Bg1.
Proof of Proposition 12. From Proposition 10 we know that @@Br < 0 for 0 <
Er  E^r and @@Bp > 0 for 0 < Ep  E^p. Assume the prevailing levels of ideology
of the social groups are given by the vector f1 (0) = (f
p
1 (0) ; f
r
1 (0)). We want
to know how the equilibrium tax rate  is a¤ected by a simultaneous change in
ideology. We focus on changes such that both social groups vary their ideology
in the direction f (0) = (fp (0) ; fr (0)) : The new levels of ideology are given
by the vector f2 (0) = (f
p
1 (0) + tf
p (0) ; fr1 (0) + tf
r (0)) = (fp1 (0) ; f
r
1 (0)) +
t (fp (0) ; fr (0)), for t 2 R. To calculate the impact of this change of ideology
we need to compute the directional derivative @

@f(0) , which is given by
@
@f (0)
=

@
@fp (0)
;
@
@fr (0)

1
kf (0)k (f
p (0) ; fr (0))
Let us start nding the direction vector f? (0) = (f
p
? (0) ; f
r
? (0)) such that if
both social groups change their ideology according to that direction, the impact
on the equilibrium tax rate is null, that is, f? (0) = (f
p
? (0) ; f
r
? (0)) leads to
@
@f?(0)
= 0. Then
@
@f? (0)
=
1
kf? (0)k

@
@fp (0)
fp? (0) +
@
@fr (0)
fr? (0)

= 0
A simple manipulation gives
f? (0) =

  @

@fr (0)
;
@
@fp (0)

Then,
@
@f? (0)
= 0 if f? (0) = (f
p
? (0) ; f
r
? (0)) =

  @

@fr (0)
;
@
@fp (0)

(31)
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Note that the vector f? (0) = (f
p
? (0) ; f
r
? (0)) is perpendicular to the gradient
vector r (fp0 (0) ; fr0 (0)) =

@
@fp(0) ;
@
@fr(0)

.
We start the analysis by a simplifying assumption, which will be relaxed in
Part II: We assume that the vector f? (0) is parallel to the vector (1; 1), that
is, fp? (0) = f
r
? (0). Using this condition of colinearity with (1; 1) we obtain
  @

@fr (0)
=
@
@fp (0)
(32)
From expressions (18) and (19) we have the following facts:
@
@fp(0) =
 
p
D
 @V p ()
@

K > 0
@
@fr(0) =
 
r
D
 @V r ()
@

K < 0
where D = C 00 () y (rr (1 +Br) + pp (1 +Bp)) : Then, substituting in
(32) we have
    1D r @V r ()@

K =
 
1
D

p

@V p ()
@

K
or
 rp

@V r ()
@

=

@V p ()
@

(33)
To satisfy expression (32) we need to nd conditions to satisfy expression (33).
We know that
@V p ()
@
= [(1  C 0 ()) y   yp]+Bp
"
(1  C 0 ()) y   yp + Ep
X
k2 p
jyk   ypj
np
#
> 0
and
@V r ()
@
= [(1  C 0 ()) y   yr]+Br
"
(1  C 0 ()) y   yr + Er
X
k2 r
jyk   yrj
nr
#
< 0
First, supposing Br = 0 , we see that 9 ~Bp such that (33) holds. This is given
by
 rp [(1  C 0 ()) y   yr]
= [(1  C 0 ()) y   yp] + ~Bp
"
(1  C 0 ()) y   yp + Ep
X
k2 p
jyk   ypj
np
#
Then,
~Bp =
 
r
p [(1 C
0())y yr] [(1 C0())y yp]
(1 C0())y yp+Ep
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
 (34)
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Whether ~Bp is positive or negative depends on the values of yrand yp as the
denominator is positive for 0 < Ep  E^p. The numerator is positive when
 r [(1  C 0 ()) y   yr]  p [(1  C 0 ()) y   yp] > 0 (35)
Consider two individuals, a poor and a rich. For a poor individual there exists
" > 0 such that yp = y   ". For a rich individual there exists "1 > 0 such that
yr = y + "1. Substituting into expression (35) we have
 r [(1  C 0 ()) y   y   "1]  p [(1  C 0 ()) y   y + "] > 0
leading to
C 0 () y + r"1   p" > 0
As C 0 () y > 0 then for ~Bp to be positive we need that r"1   p"  0 which
reduces to
[yr   y]  
p
r
[y   yp] (36)
We assume expression (36) holds, therefore ~Bp > 0.14
Second, assume that Bp = 0; then 9 ~Br such that (33) holds. This occurs if
 rp [(1  C 0 ()) y   yr]  ~Br 
r
p
"
(1  C 0 ()) y   yr + Er
X
k2 r
jyk   yrj
nr
#
= [(1  C 0 ()) y   yp]
Then,
~Br =
 
r
p [(1 C
0())y yr] [(1 C0())y yp]
r
p
h
(1 C0())y yr+Er
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
i (37)
We already know that as
h
(1  C 0 ()) y   yr + Er
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
i
< 0 for 0 <
Er  E^r the denominator is negative. The numerator of expression (37) is
exactly expression (35) which is positive. Then, in this case ~Br < 0.
Now that we have computed the bounds

~Bp; ~Br

we can nd (Bp; Br) such
that expression (33) holds. This occurs when
 
r
p [(1 C
0())y yr] Br 
r
p

(1 C0())y yr+Er
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr

=[(1 C0())y yp]+Bp

(1 C0())y yp+Ep
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np

Some manipulations lead to
Br =

(1 C0())y yp+Ep
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np

 
r
p
h
(1 C0())y yr+Er
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
iBp+ 
r
p [(1 C
0())y yr]+[(1 C0())y yp]
 
r
p
h
(1 C0())y yr+Er
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
i
(38)
14For ~Bp < 0 we need to satisfy the condition C0 () y+r [yr   y] < p [y   yp], which is
stronger than expression (36).
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Substituting expressions (34) and (37) into expression (38) we have
Br =  
~Br
~Bp
Bp + ~Br
Then expression (33) holds whenever the social groups exhibit inner altruism
given by
(Bp; Br) =
 
Bp; 
~Br
~Bp
Bp + ~Br
!
(39)
for Bp > ~Bp.15 As a consequence, expression (32) holds whenever the social
groups exhibit inner altruism given by (Bp; Br) such that Bp > ~Bp and Br =
  ~Br~BpBp+ ~Br. This condition ensures that the derivatives are identical and have
opposite sign. Condition (39) allows us to show that there are values ( ~Bp; ~Br)
such that if the level of inner altruism exhibited by the poor and the rich (Bp; Br)
satisfy Bp > ~Bp and Br =   ~Br~BpBp + ~Br, a change in the level of ideology
of the groups in the direction f (0) = (fp (0) ; fr (0)) generates the following
comparative static e¤ect:
a) @

@f(0) = 0, if f
p (0) = fr (0),
b) @

@f(0) > 0, if f
p (0) > fr (0), i.e., the tax rate increases when ideology
decreases, provide the poor are less ideological.
c) @

@f(0) < 0, if f
p (0) < fr (0), i.e., the tax rate decreases when ideology
decreases, provide the rich are less ideological.
This rst set of results are obtained for the knife-edge condition (32) and
holds for a value of Br that is uniquely determined by the choice of Bp: We
now extend our result to an open set of values of (Bp; Br): We now extend
this results by relaxing the condition (32) and instead analyze the case when
  @@fr(0) > @

@fp(0) : From the previous paragraphs we see that whenever (Bp; Br)
satisfy Bp > ~Bp and Br >   ~Br~BpBp+ ~Br we have that  
@
@fr(0) >
@
@fp(0) :We then
have the second group of results:
1. There are values ( ~Bp; ~Br) such that if the level of inner altruism exhibited
by the poor and the rich (Bp; Br) satisfy Bp > ~Bp and Br >   ~Br~BpBp+ ~Br,
a change in ideology in the direction f (0) = (fp (0) ; fr (0)) generates the
following e¤ect:
(a) @

@f(0) = 0 if
fp(0)
fr(0) =
  @
@fr(0)
@
@fp(0)
> 1) fp (0) > fr (0)
15We need to satisfy this condition to have Br > 0. If Bp  ~Bp then Br  0, which is
meaningless in the model.
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(b) @

@f(0) > 0, if
fp(0)
fr(0) >
  @
@fr(0)
@
@fp(0)
> 1 ) fp (0) >> fr (0)
(c) @

@f(0) < 0, if
fp(0)
fr(0) <
  @
@fr(0)
@
@fp(0)
which is satised for fp (0) < fr (0)
and for fp (0) > fr (0) >
@
@fp(0)
  @
@fr(0)
fp (0).
Result 1c) is interesting as it allows for a reduction in the tax rate while the
rich are more ideological than the poor. We now nd conditions for this case
to occur. From expression (39) we see that whether or not the poor are more
altruistic than the rich, Bp v.s. Br, depends on the values ~Bp and ~Br. Given
the functional form of Br in expression (38), if   ~Br  ~Bp then automatically
Br > Bp implies that the conditions for the second group of results are satised,
as in this case Bp > ~Bp and Br >   ~Br~BpBp + ~Br.
16 The case when   ~Br > ~Bp
is more complicated and do not o¤er so much additional information to the
analysis. Therefore we just need to prove that   ~Br  ~Bp.
Instead of working directly with the inequality   ~Br  ~Bp, we start nding
conditions that satisfy   ~Br = ~Bp. We have:
r
p [(1 C
0())y yr]+[(1 C0())y yp]
r
p
h
(1 C0())y yr+Er
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
i =  
r
p [(1 C
0())y yr] [(1 C0())y yp]
(1 C0())y yp+Ep
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np

that implies h
(1  C 0 ()) y   yp + Ep
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
i
=  rp
h
(1  C 0 ()) y   yr + Er
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
i (40)
We state conditions on Ep and Er to satisfy expression (40).
First, 9 ~Ep such that if Er = 0 then expression (40) holds. This is
 rp [(1  C 0 ()) y   yr] =
"
(1  C 0 ()) y   yp + ~Ep
X
k2 p
jyk   ypj
np
#
Then,
~Ep =
 
r
p [(1 C
0())y yr] [(1 C0())y yp]P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
> 0 (41)
Therefore, ~Ep > 0 exists and from the expression of ~Ep we see that ~Ep < E^p.
Second, 9 ~Er such that if Ep = 0 then expression (40) holds. This is
[(1  C 0 ()) y   yp]
=  rp
"
(1  C 0 ()) y   yr + ~Er
X
k2 r
jyk   yrj
nr
#
16There are some altruistic terms such that Bp < Br that also satisfy the conditions for
the second group of results. However, we do not consider them for the analysis.
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Then,
~Er =
 [(1 C0())y yp] 
r
p [(1 C
0())y yr]
r
p
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
> 0 (42)
Therefore, ~Er > 0 exists and from the expression of ~Er we see that ~Er < E^r.
We can now use these values, to state that there exists (Ep; Er) such that
expression (40) holds. This condition can be written as"
(1  C 0 ()) y   yp + Ep
X
k2 p
jyk   ypj
np
#
=  rp
"
(1  C 0 ()) y   yr + Er
X
k2 r
jyk   yrj
nr
#
After a few manipulations we end up with
Er =
P
k2 p
jyk ypj
np
r
p
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
Ep +
 
r
p [(1 C
0())y yr] [(1 C0())y yp]
r
p
P
k2 r
jyk yrj
nr
(43)
Substituting (41) and (42) into (43) we have
Er =  
~Er
~Ep
Ep + ~Er
Then expression (40) holds, that is,   ~Br = ~Bp, whenever the social groups
place weights to inequality aversion given by (Ep; Er) such that
(Ep; Er) =
 
Ep; 
~Er
~Ep
Ep + ~Er
!
(44)
As a consequence, to satisfy the inequality   ~Br  ~Bp we need weights on
inequality aversion (Ep; Er) such that 0 < Ep  ~Ep and 0 < Er    ~Er~EpEp+ ~Ep.
To conclude, Result 1c) implies the following, which Proposition 12, part
1. There are values ( ~Ep; ~Er), with ~Ep  E^p and ~Er  E^r for (E^p; E^r) as
dened previously, such that if: 1) the weights given by the poor and the rich
to inequality aversion (Ep; Ep) are such that Ep  ~Ep and Er    ~Er~EpEp + ~Ep;
2) the rich exhibit greater in-group altruism than the poor (Br > Bp); and 3)
the rich are less ideological than the poor, fr (0) > fp (0), then as the social
groups change their level of ideology in the direction f (0) = (fp (0) ; fr (0))
the equilibrium tax rate decreases. The second part of the Proposition rests
again on Result 1c). However, the focus is now on the interval
@
@fp(0)
  @
@fr(0)
fp (0) <
fr (0) < fp (0) for which the rich are moderately more ideological than the poor.
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